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Global Problems in Domestic Courts
Ralf Michaels*
We face an increasing number of problems that are essentially global in
nature because they affect the world in its entirety: global cartels, climate
change, crimes against humanity; to name a few. These problems require
world courts, yet world courts in the institutional sense are largely
lacking. Hence, domestic courts must function, effectively, as world
courts. Given the unlikelihood of effective world courts in the future, our
challenge is to establish under what conditions domestic courts can play
this role of world courts effectively and legitimately.

1. Introduction
Lawyers are bad at predicting the future; they have enough work on their
hands with the present. Despite frequent claims that law is proactive – it
guides conduct – its substance is almost always reactive, a reaction to
recognised social problems. The law lags. Moreover, the acceleration of
all aspects of life (one of the key characteristics of globalisation) has led
to a situation in which deliberative responses by lawmakers almost always
come, if not too late, then at least with a considerable delay. This has long
been true for legislators and courts (and has led to the turn to the
executive in lawmaking). Moreover, it is true, increasingly, for executive
action, too.
This inability of lawyers (and of the law) to predict the future is
well-known, but it is neither trivial nor easy to overcome. It has a twofold
implication for attempts to answer the question as to the biggest
challenges for the law in the near future. First, although substantive
problems are always new and often unpredictable, structural problems are
relatively constant. We may not know what substantive questions the law
will have to resolve in the future, but we can guess what structure many of
these problems will have. In short, they will be global problems that
transcend national boundaries (though in a particular way that I will
discuss later). Second, to prepare the law for the future, we should first
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make sure it matches the requirements of the present. We do not know for
sure what globalisation will bring in the future, but we do know that the
law is structurally ill-equipped even for its present. Presuming that
globalisation will continue, a law more adequately prepared for
globalisation would be desirable in the future.
The biggest structural challenge for current law is well-known (and
actually expressed in the background note) but not well understood: more
and more problems are global, while our institutions are not. Although we
have been aware of this challenge for considerable time, our responses
have so far been insufficient. Supranational institutions, as one solution,
will not be able to deal with all of these problems to a sufficient degree.
Global legal unification will also remain incomplete. Networks are a
fascinating, but at the same time slightly elusive, new concept. As a
consequence, what we will be left with, for a large portion of global
problems, is fragmentation, ensuring the need for domestic institutions,
especially courts, to deal with these global problems. Where necessary,
they have to do so in a unilateral fashion.
Fragmentation may be considered undesirable (though this is not
certain), but to the extent we cannot overcome it we need to make the best
of it. What we need are three things. First, we need a better understanding
of what global problems actually are, how they differ from other problems
that may or may not also be related to globalisation, and how they
challenge current concepts of law. Second, we need a better
understanding of the role that domestic institutions, in particular courts,
can play in response to such problems, and thereby for the global legal
system at large. Third, we need better criteria, both legal and political, for
when and how domestic courts can perform these roles. In this brief
position paper (based on a book I am currently working on) I will address
these three aspects.
2. Global Problems
Globalisation creates a lot of new problems for the law, but many of those
do not require paradigmatically new thinking because they fit in the
traditional disciplines of either domestic law or international law.
Many problems are domestic in nature, which means that domestic
law and institutions can deal with them in the same way as before.
Recently, they have been helped more and more by comparative law –
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they have realised that other countries face similar problems, and
therefore may provide valuable inspiration – but this alone does not create
any paradigmatic changes.
Other problems are international in nature: they concern various
countries and/or their relations among each other. Much trade law is in
this category. More perhaps than domestic problems, such international
problems create new challenges to the law, because international law, the
typical response to such problems, today covers a far broader array of
issues than it did before. Again, however, what this requires is an
extension of existing paradigms, not a paradigmatic change.
A paradigmatic change will be required, by contrast, for what I call
global problems. Global problems are characterised by two qualities.
First, they concern the world at large, not just one country or one region,
or the relations between only a few countries (this does not mean that they
necessarily affect everyone similarly.) Second, they cannot be separated
into different sub-problems that can be solved individually. Rather, an
adequate response has an effect on the whole problem.
We can distinguish different kinds of global problems, according to
what makes them global (although the boundaries between these
categories are not sharp, distinguishing them helps the analysis). Some
problems are global by nature. Climate change may be a prime example.
It is a problem that is global by nature not because the problem has been
created by nature (in all likelihood it has not) but instead because the
nature of our climate makes it so that solutions can never be only local.
Other problems are global by design. Liability for internet defamation is a
prime example here: the internet has been designed so as to be globally
accessible, with the result that, without special software, content becomes
accessible from anywhere. Here the global character of the problem is a
consequence of the design of the internet – a redesign of the internet or its
infrastructure, including software, can change the problem‘s character.
Some problems, finally, are global by definition. Crimes against
humanity, for example, are global because we decide to conceptualise
them as such, as directed not against the individual victims (who may well
be defined by territory or nationality) but instead against a global category
par excellence, namely humanity at large.
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3. A Global Problem by Nature: Global Markets
One type of global problems by nature concerns global markets. A good
example from the law of antitrust is the Empagran decision of the US
Supreme Court, rendered in 2004. Several producers of certain vitamin
products, most of them European, had fixed prices worldwide and made
billions of dollars in profits. The US plaintiffs sued in the US and
received considerable payments under a settlement. The interesting case
was brought not by US consumers but by consumers from countries like
Ecuador and the Ukraine, who had also suffered injuries from inflated
prices, and who sued the cartel members in a US court in a worldwide
class action. Foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign markets –
should US courts have jurisdiction?
Worldwide price fixing is a global problem by nature, because,
given the current conditions of global markets, it cannot be territorially
confined or split up. Where we have truly worldwide markets, participants
in cartels must necessarily fix prices worldwide because if they fix them
only for specific national markets, the consumers in those markets will
purchase their products elsewhere, and this arbitrage will make the cartel
ineffective. In this sense, the cartel participants in the Empagran case did
not, nor in fact could they fix prices individually for individual markets;
they raised prices globally because the global character of the market in
vitamin products forced them to do so.
Much of the debate concerned the question whether the US had any
interest, thus asking essentially whether the global cartel was a domestic
problem or not. The defendants pointed out that the U.S. had no interest in
regulating foreign markets. The plaintiffs on the other hand argued that
US consumers would benefit from these claims by foreign plaintiffs,
because these claims would enhance the deterrent effect on the cartel,
which would otherwise remain undeterred. Defendants focused on the
specific plaintiffs with their injuries; plaintiffs focused on the whole event
of the cartel and its effects on the US economy. Both agreed, however,
that the connection to the US was crucial, and both ignored the rest of the
world. This was inadequate. After all, some countries such as Canada and
Japan, as well as the European Commission – had levied high fines on the
cartel. With regard to these countries, there was obviously additional
deterrence for cartels. Other countries, by contrast, had not.
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Along these lines, Europeans invoked international law and
relations and submitted amicus curiae briefs in the litigation, arguing in
essence that jurisdiction of US courts would interfere with their sovereign
interests – even though all countries agree that, in substance, price fixing
is illegal. They argued that each country should deal with the effects on its
own local markets and that private suits to enforce antitrust laws were
against European culture. The Supreme Court essentially followed these
complaints (although with a twist to be mentioned later) and rejected the
claim. The problem with this argument is that it presumes that the cartel
can be divided into territorial subparts, and this seems doubtful.
Europeans point out that the task of US antitrust law is to protect US
consumers, not to regulate foreign markets. But what if the protection of
US consumers requires the regulation of foreign markets? Worse, what if
there is no difference between foreign and local markets at all, because we
have only one global market in vitamins? Moreover, the European
countries that submitted amicus curiae briefs argued successfully against
US hegemonialism. However the result of their intervention was that
plaintiffs from Ecuador and Ukraine were unable to recover their damages
anywhere. One could well describe this as a different kind of
hegemonialism, this time over developing countries that do not have the
infrastructure to prosecute global cartels and that rely on the first world to
do this for them.
In the end, both approaches appear inadequate, because they do not
capture the global character of the problem. The domestic approach must
fail because it ignores the degree to which the cartel has effects outside
the United States. The international approach must fail because it requires
separability of the cartel: the United States can leave the regulation of the
European part of the cartel to Europeans, only if such a separate part
exists; this however, is doubtful.
4. A Global Problem by Design: The Review of UN Security Council
Resolutions
An example of global problems by design is the review of resolutions by
the UN Security Council. Such problems are global by design because
their global nature follows from the design of the Security Council as a
global institution. Such resolutions create international law, so the
Security Council can be understood as a kind of global legislator.
However, judicial review of its decisions is not provided under
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international law. Early ideas to give review competence to the
International Court of Justice (the most obvious candidate) were rejected
by some of the permanent members of the Security Council.
The consequence is that such a review can only be provided, if at
all, by domestic courts. This became urgent especially with resolutions
that froze assets of individuals assembled on a list of presumed financiers
of international terrorism. Because these resolutions did not provide these
individuals with recourse, some of them appealed instead to domestic
courts in various countries, and to the Court of First Instance in the
European Union (Kadi). The Kadi case is an example for both the
potential and the conceptual limits of domestic courts when faced with
this problem (for purposes of this analysis, the Court of First Instance and
the European Court of Justice as an appellate court can be understood as
quasi-domestic courts). The Court of First Instance effectively denied that
domestic courts were competent to review resolutions of the Security
Council, except implicitly. The European Court of Justice, by contrast,
presumed that it was possible to review such resolutions insofar as they
had been transposed into domestic law, thereby ignoring their
supranational character. Both approaches map well on a distinction
between the international law and a domestic law paradigm, but both
seem similarly incapable of grasping the specifically global character of
these resolutions. The opinion of the Advocate General came closest to a
global approach when he spoke of a situation of legal pluralism between
domestic, European and international law. What is lacking from his
analysis as well as from most commentary on the decisions is a proper
conceptualisation of the global legal system in which domestic courts act
effectively as review courts.
5. A Global Problem by Definition: Human Rights Violations
An example of global problems by definition is human rights litigation. If
a Nigerian woman living in Nigeria with her Nigerian husband is stoned
to death because of alleged adultery with another Nigerian, this seems to
be an affair entirely internal to Nigeria. Indeed, ‗internal affair‘ is the
exact codeword governments traditionally use to oppose any intervention
by foreign journalists, politicians and courts. But of course we reject such
claims in the human rights realm, and we do so with an argumentative
trick. We change the victim‘s status from (local) citizen to (global)
human. We turn the perpetrator from an enemy of the victim to an enemy
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of the world, a hostis humani generis. We raise crimes from the localised
crime of murder to the globalised crime against humanity. Murder would
have to be prosecuted according to the territorial laws. A crime against
humanity on the other hand is by definition deterritorialised, simply
because humanity transcends all territoriality, except (perhaps) that of the
globe. The colère global, to paraphrase Durkheim, the global outrage over
a crime, turns a territorial event into a world event.
One of the oldest federal statutes, the so-called Alien Tort Statute,
gives federal courts jurisdiction for ―a tort only in violation of
international law‖. This statute lay dormant for nearly 200 years until it
was revived in 1980, and turned into a main jurisdictional basis for human
rights violations. The statute gives something akin to universal
jurisdiction, which means that human rights violations from all across the
globe can be carried before US courts and are in fact carried there.
Universal criminal jurisdiction over human rights violations is currently
much discussed, and often favourably – although the International
Criminal Court is often preferred as a venue, domestic courts are
considered to play a role, too. The American Alien Tort Statute is special,
however. First, it applies to private plaintiffs, so plaintiff lawyers rather
than state attorneys decide about prosecution. Second, it has been applied
not only against government officials (who are frequently immune from
lawsuits), but also against corporations that collaborate with governments.
Thereby, many multinational companies have been turned into potential
defendants against such claims.
Not surprisingly, this basis of jurisdiction is now under severe
criticism both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Human rights violations taking
place elsewhere are not domestic US problems and they do not create
significant US interests (beyond such secondary interests like the interest
in being a good citizen of the world). It would seem easier to find
international law solutions, but only prima facie. First, the country that is
primarily interested, is often the country whose government committed or
at least took part in the human rights violation. Second, and perhaps even
more importantly, international law solutions tend to leave decisions over
whether human rights violations are adjudicated to governments, and
governments, for reasons of international relations, will often be unwilling
to inquire.
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6. The Role of Domestic Courts
Local events can be dealt with by domestic courts in accordance with
domestic law; international events as events between nations can be dealt
with by international courts, established by and under international laws.
Global problems, however, cannot be dealt with adequately by domestic
or international law, at least in the ways in which we traditionally
understand them.
One response to global problems has been the creation of truly
global courts, the International Criminal Court being a prime example.
Even if we assume such institutions to be normatively desirable (and
doubts exist on this, particularly in the United States), it seems clear now
that, at least in the short run, we will not have a sufficient number of such
institutions. International criminal law is a good example: the vast
majority of cases under the jurisdiction of the ICC are dealt with (if at all)
by domestic courts.
A second response has been closer cooperation – sometimes called
networks – between courts. Such networks can, to some extent, substitute
for true global courts by bringing everyone in. At the same time, networks
face high coordination problems once the number of involved courts
becomes great – as will often be the case with global problems. Moreover,
networks fail where different countries differ either in their substantive
perspectives or, perhaps even more often, in their desire to be active (a
free-rider problem).
This suggests that much of globalisation will continue to be
handled, quasi-unilaterally, by domestic institutions, in particular
domestic courts. I say continue, because domestic courts already deal with
such problems. Frequently, however, they feel the need to deny the global
character of these problems. The Supreme Court decision in the
Empagran case shows this clearly. In holding for the defendants, the court
assumed explicitly that the cartel‘s effects on the US were separate from
the effects on foreign markets, but we know of course that these effects
are not independent from each other. The court rested its decision on facts
that are demonstrably wrong, but the court had to do so in order to
conceptualise the problem of global cartels. Only the fictitious
compartmentalisation of global markets made it possible to reconcile
global cartels with traditional approaches to jurisdiction. Obviously this
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does not make the problem go away, and indeed the problem may well
reach the Supreme Court again.
The reason for such redefinition of the global character is our
uneasiness with unilateral extraterritorial adjudication. We have long
rejected unilateral action by domestic courts as illegitimate, and we still
feel it to be inferior to international agreement or adjudication by
supranational courts. As a consequence, the main concern in unilateral
adjudication has been devoted, usually, to constraining it. Given that such
unilateral adjudication will, in the foreseeable future, remain the
predominant legal response to globalisation, this is unsatisfactory. We
will need a better theory of when and how such adjudication is possible.
If global problems require global courts, how can domestic courts
play a role? Semantically, we must distinguish two very different aspects
of ‗global‘ that are often confounded. One is the institutional, or
constitutional, aspect. In this sense a global court is a court that has been
set up by the world, a court of the world. Of course the world in its
entirety is unable to set up the court, which is why we have recourse to
international treaties or the United Nations as a kind of second best. I call
these courts international courts, because they are founded on
international law. But there is another aspect of ‗global‘ in world courts,
and it concerns the scope of application, the ‗reach‘ if you will, the
jurisdiction. Here, a world court is a court for the world. This aspect is
analytically different from the first one, though of course both may
coincide. Thus the International Court of Justice is a world court also in
this second sense; its jurisdiction is worldwide. However, the reach of
domestic courts on the other hand can be global, too. If it is, these courts
act as world courts.
7. Challenges
How can domestic courts adequately respond to these challenges? Short
of actual solutions, this paper can list the areas in which we will require
rethinking.
One area concerns the discipline that will have to bear much of the
burden from these problems: conflict of laws. Conflict of laws, as
traditionally understood, deals with relations between different legal
systems and the localisation of problems in one of these systems. It
determines the competent courts and the applicable law on the basis of
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connecting factors that connect a set of facts more closely to one country
and its laws. For global problems, however, we are frequently faced with
either universal or ubiquitous jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is
jurisdiction that, in principle, every country‘s courts can exercise.
Ubiquitous jurisdiction can be defined as jurisdiction that is based on
factors that connect a problem to every country, for example accessibility
of a website. Neither universal nor ubiquitous jurisdiction fit well in the
traditional criteria, and we may have to develop new approaches. One
example can be found in Article 6(3)(b) of the Rome II Regulation, which
allows a court, under certain conditions, to apply its own law on unfair
competition even to the claims of plaintiffs who purchased on other
markets. Although the provision is far from perfect, some of the criticism
it has received seems unjustified: if the provision does not fit well with
traditional private international law, this may be a sign less of the
provision‘s inadequacy and instead of the discipline‘s inadequacy.
Notably, extraterritoriality is not a helpful criterion to assess such
adjudication. If global problems could be separated into territorial
components, each court could adjudicate a neatly defined territorial space,
and the problem of extraterritoriality should not occur. Global problems,
by contrast cannot be so separated. Global cartels are global because they
transcend boundaries and territories – price changes in one country
necessitate price changes in other countries. Human rights violations are
global precisely because we define them as such; we emphasise the
deterritorialised interests of humanity at-large over the territorially
confined interests of the specific victims or their perpetrators. In short,
because world events are deterritorialised, they do not involve the
territorial interests which would trigger complaints that territorial
sovereignty is infringed. Without territoriality there is no
extraterritoriality.
Another area concerns institutional requirements. Traditionally,
domestic courts are expected to deal with domestic problems, either under
their own law or under foreign law – they lack a global perspective. We
have made progress towards such a perspective. For example, the
increased use of comparative law shows an increasingly global awareness
on the part of judges. However, more will be needed. We will need
doctrines that detach the judicial task from the furthering of domestic
political interests. We will need courts with an understanding of the
implications their decisions have for governance – not just domestic or
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international, but global governance. What helps courts in this regard is
their relative independence. After all, the legitimacy of courts lies not in
their direct accountability to the electorate but in the quality of their
decisions, if necessary, against political pressure.
This last point leads to a third challenge. Accountability to the
electorate prevents the other branches of government – the executive and
especially the legislature – from truly globalizing; in the end they are
expected to protect the interests of their voters over those of others. This
suggests that democratically made law on the national level can lack
legitimacy on the global sphere. The traditional response to such lack of
legitimacy is for courts to limit application of domestic law to areas for
which the domestic lawmaker has both jurisdiction and an actual
regulatory interest. This process is inadequate – it either leads to the
application of a law that is, at least potentially, equally parochial, or to the
dismissal of a claim for lack of regulatory interest of any concerned
government. The alternative for courts will be to develop transnational
law on their own, even in deviation from domestic rules of substantive
law and of private international law.
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